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Misperceived Social Norms: 
Women Working Outside the Home in Saudi Arabia†
By Leonardo Bursztyn, Alessandra L. González, 
and David  Yanagizawa-Drott*
We show that the vast majority of young married men in Saudi 
Arabia privately support women working outside the home 
(WWOH) and substantially underestimate support by other simi-
lar men. Correcting these beliefs increases men’s (costly) willing-
ness to help their wives search for jobs. Months later, wives of men 
whose beliefs were corrected are more likely to have applied and 
interviewed for a job outside the home. In a recruitment experiment 
with a local company, randomly informing women about actual 
support for WWOH leads them to switch from an  at-home tempo-
rary enumerator job to a  higher-paying,  outside-the-home version 
of the job. (JEL D83, J16, J22, O15, Z13)
Saudi Arabia is a salient example of a country with a low rate of female labor 
force participation. Less than 15 percent of the Saudi female population aged 15 
and above were employed in 2017 (a labor force participation rate of around 18 per-
cent).1 The share of women working outside the home, an action that others can 
easily observe, is substantially lower. In a national survey we conducted with young 
married Saudi males in early 2018, only 4 percent had their wife currently work-
ing outside the home. Moreover, through the custom of male guardianship, hus-
bands commonly have the final word on their wives’ labor supply decisions in Saudi 
Arabia.
In this paper, we consider opinions on whether women should be allowed to work 
outside the home, and pursue the idea that Saudi society is experiencing “pluralistic 
ignorance” (Katz, Allport, and Jenness 1931). This refers to a situation where most 
people privately hold an opinion, but they incorrectly believe that most other people 
1 See General Authority for Statistics, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2017).
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hold the contrary opinion, and therefore end up acting against their own view. When 
individuals believe a behavior or attitude is stigmatized, they might be reluctant to 
reveal their private views to others for fear of social sanction.2 If most individuals 
act this way, they might all end up believing their private views are only shared by 
a small minority at most.3 We, therefore, ask: do Saudi men have correct percep-
tions of the opinions held by other men regarding women working outside the home 
(WWOH)? If the social norm is misperceived, then does correcting beliefs lead 
more women to work outside the home?
We combine experiments and surveys to first provide incentivized evidence that 
the majority of married men in Saudi Arabia in fact support WWOH, while they 
substantially underestimate the level of support for WWOH by other men—even 
those from their same social setting, such as neighbors. We then show that randomly 
correcting these beliefs about others increases married men’s willingness to let their 
wives search for jobs (as measured by their costly  sign up for a mobile  job matching 
service for their wives). We also find that this decision maps onto real outcomes. 
Three to five months after the main intervention, the wives of men in our original 
sample (whose beliefs about acceptability of WWOH were corrected) are more likely 
to have applied and interviewed for a job outside the home. Finally, using a natural 
recruitment experiment with a local company, we find that misperception correction 
leads to a higher share of women taking a  higher-paying,  outside-the-home tempo-
rary survey enumerator job over a similar job to be performed from home.
More specifically, we first report on an experiment with a sample of 500 Saudi 
married men aged  18–35, recruited from different neighborhoods in Riyadh. These 
men each attended a  30-participant session, composed of individuals from the same 
geographical area, thus sharing a common social network.4 In an anonymous online 
survey, 87 percent of the experimental participants agreed with the statement, “In 
my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside the home.” When incentiv-
ized to guess how other session participants responded to the same question, about 
 three-quarters of the experimental subjects underestimate the true number. We inter-
pret this as evidence of misperception of social norms, even among people from the 
same neighborhood who know each other.
Next, we evaluate whether correcting these misperceptions matters for a revealed 
preference decision, associated with household labor supply. One-half of the par-
ticipants were randomly given feedback on the true number of agreements with 
the statement in their session. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked 
2 Following Bénabou and Tirole (2011), we think of social norms as the set of “social sanctions or rewards” that 
incentivize a certain behavior. We examine injunctive, but not descriptive norms.
3 Historic examples of pluralistic ignorance include the late Soviet regime (Kuran 1991), where many individu-
als opposed the regime but believed others supported it. In 1968, most white Americans substantially overestimated 
the support for racial segregation among other whites (O’Gorman 1975). Work in psychology has also documented 
pluralistic ignorance regarding alcohol use on college campuses (Prentice and Miller 1993). A related concept is 
“preference falsification” (Kuran 1995): people’s stated, public preferences are influenced by social acceptability, 
and might be different from their true, private preferences. More closely related to our study, González (2013) 
documents that the majority of male Kuwaiti college students in her sample believed women should work outside 
the home, while they thought that the majority of their religious community would not approve of it. For a recent 
overview in social psychology, see Tankard and Paluck (2016). For the related concept of “third-order inference” 
in sociology, see Correll et al. (2017). Recent work by Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (forthcoming) has analyzed 
how factors correcting beliefs about what others think might generate fast changes in the perceived acceptability of 
certain behaviors, and also in actual behavior.
4 The average participant reported knowing 15 of the 29 other session participants.
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to make an incentivized choice between receiving an additional bonus payment (an 
online gift card) and signing their wives up for a job matching mobile application, 
specializing in the Saudi female labor market. In a control group without belief cor-
rections, 23 percent of participants chose the job matching service. In the treatment 
group with feedback on the opinions of other participants, the share went up sig-
nificantly, by 9 percentage points (a 36 percent increase). The increase is driven by 
those who underestimated the true share of WWOH participant supporters in their 
session:  sign up rates go up by 57 percent (from a baseline rate of 21 percent) when 
this group is provided with information, while information doesn’t change  sign up 
rates for those who did not underestimate support by others (that group also has a 
higher baseline  sign up rate of 31 percent).5
One might be worried that the  sign up outcome is not strongly indicative of actual 
labor supply decisions, or that the immediate decision does not imply a more per-
manent change in perceived social norms and behavior. To deal with these concerns, 
three to five months after the original intervention, participants were recontacted by 
phone and a series of additional outcome questions were collected.6 We document a 
 longer-term impact on  self-reported labor supply outcomes. Wives of treated partic-
ipants were significantly more likely to have applied for a job outside the home (up 
by 10 percentage points from a baseline level of 6 percent) and to have interviewed 
for a job outside the home (up by 5 percentage points from a baseline level of 1 per-
cent). We are not powered to detect a significant change in the likelihood of the wife 
being employed outside the home, though we directionally observe an increase. 
We also document that the change in perceived social norms is persistent. Treated 
participants believe a significantly higher share of their neighbors in general support 
women working outside the home. Finally, we observe that the persistent change in 
perceived social norms might spill over to other behaviors. Treated participants are 
significantly more likely to report that they would sign up their wives for driving 
lessons. These findings are robust to adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.7
5 This first outcome is a decision made by husbands/guardians, and not by wives themselves. We think hus-
bands’ decisions are crucial, since we are examining men’s potential reluctance to let their wives join the labor force 
due to perceived social norms as an obstacle for WWOH. Moreover, due to the custom of male guardianship, hus-
bands typically have the final word on their wives’ labor supply decisions. Until 2011, guardians’ permission was 
legally required but since then their permission is asked by many, but not all, hiring firms. In our separate recruit-
ment experiment below, we provide evidence from a firm which does not require written approval. We analyze the 
effects of giving information directly to women. Also note, that because a participant’s wife’s eventual employment 
status is observable, the observability of the  sign up choice itself does not matter independently.
6 To preserve anonymity in the original experiment, while still being able to contact participants in the future, 
phone numbers were first collected at the session level without matching them to specific respondents, before the 
experiment started. In the follow-up phone survey, participants were asked for the last three digits of their phone 
numbers. We were able to match 95 percent of the phone numbers to the combination of last three digits and session 
number.
7 Since the vast majority of men in our sample privately support WWOH, we believe updates in perceived social 
acceptability are the main mechanism driving our findings (in online Appendix A, we present a simple model of 
labor supply and stigma based on this mechanism). However, it is possible that the information provided leads 
some participants from having a privately negative opinion about WWOH to a positive one. We did not collect 
updated opinions after the information was provided to verify this possibility. Still, we can check the treatment 
effects for those originally opposed to WWOH. We find a large point estimate (10.9 percentage point increase from 
a baseline  sign up rate of 10.7 percent in the control group), but this estimate is not significant, perhaps due to the 
small sample size for that group (N = 65). This might be interpreted as suggestive evidence of a persuasive effect 
of the information treatment in that subsample. However, it is also consistent with these participants not changing 
their opinions, but changing their behavior because they care strongly about their social image and their percep-
tions of norms have been substantially updated. Indeed, the average wedge among those originally negative about 
WWOH is substantially and significantly larger than among those originally positive: −11 percentage points versus 
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We also conduct a  similar-looking, anonymous online survey with a larger, 
national sample of about 1,500 married Saudi men, aged  18–35. The goal of this 
additional survey is  twofold. First, we assess the external validity of the finding that 
most Saudi men privately support WWOH while failing to understand that others do 
as well. In this broader, more representative sample, 82 percent of men agree with 
the same statement on WWOH used in the main experiment. When incentivized to 
guess the responses of other survey respondents, 92 percent of them underestimate 
the true share. These are stronger misperceptions, perhaps because they are no lon-
ger asked about their own neighbors’ opinions.
We examine whether social desirability bias/experimenter demand effects could 
be a driver of the misperception finding in the main experiment. Although the exper-
iment was anonymous, it is possible that some participants may have felt like they 
had to answer the question about their own views in a certain way. One-half of the 
online survey participants were assigned an elicitation procedure that provided a 
“cover” for their opinion on WWOH. In particular, we implemented a “list exper-
iment” (also called the “unmatched count” and the “item count technique,” origi-
nally formalized by Raghavarao and Federer 1979).8 Using a method that provides 
respondents with a higher degree of plausible deniability, we find a very similar 
level of agreement with the statement regarding whether women should be allowed 
to work outside the home: 80 percent. Finally, we examine whether individuals may 
incorrectly expect others to strategically respond to the WWOH agreement ques-
tion, which would distort guesses about others since the question asked about how 
others answered the question. We find that beliefs about other participants’ true 
opinions were extremely similar to the guesses about others’ answers. In sum, we 
find no evidence that survey response biases drive our results.
As an additional check on the external validity of the fact we document, we show 
that the share of Saudi men supportive of WWOH is also very similar when using the 
nationally representative sample from the wave of the Arab Barometer containing 
that question for Saudi Arabia ( 2010–2011). Out of approximately 700 male respon-
dents, 77 percent are in favor of WWOH and among male respondents aged  18–35 
(the age bracket in our study), the share is 79 percent. The Arab Barometer survey 
also allows us to establish that older men are also supportive of WWOH: among 
those over 35, the share agreeing with that statement is 74 percent. Moreover, the 
numbers from the Arab Barometer in  2010–2011 suggest that the misperception in 
−6.7 percentage points. ( p = 0.000). Furthermore, the point estimate of the treatment effect is unchanged when 
we restrict the analysis to those who originally reported positive own views about WWOH. Finally, the treatment 
effects are stronger for those who experience a larger update in beliefs about the opinions of others. As we discuss 
below, results from an additional survey we conducted provide evidence consistent with our mechanism: most men 
report very rarely discussing the topic of whether women should be allowed to work outside the home with their 
male friends and relatives, and those who rarely discuss the subject have much stronger misperceptions than those 
who commonly discuss it.
8 The list experiment works as follows: first, respondents are (randomly) assigned either into a control group or 
to one or to a treatment group. Subjects in all conditions are asked to indicate the number of policy positions they 
support from a list of positions on several issues. Support for any particular policy position is never indicated, only 
the total number of positions articulated on the list that a subject supports. In the control condition, the list includes a 
set of contentious, but not stigmatized, policy positions. In the treatment condition, the list includes the contentious 
policy positions from the control list, but also adds the policy position of interest (support for WWOH), which is 
potentially stigmatized. The degree of support for the stigmatized position at the sample level is determined by 
comparing the average number of issues supported in the treatment and control conditions. For another recent 
application of list experiments, see Enikolopov et al. (2020).
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social norms might have not have been a  short-lived phenomenon, at least in the 
sense that support for WWOH has been high and remained relatively constant until 
today.
We also provide a discussion on lack of communication as a potential driver for 
these misperceptions. In an additional national survey we conduct, a large frac-
tion of respondents report to either rarely or very rarely discuss with their male 
friends and relatives the topic of whether women should be allowed to work outside 
the home. Moreover, frequency of discussion is a very strong predictor of the size 
of misperceptions. On average, there are very small misperceptions among those 
frequently discussing the topic, and very large misperceptions among those rarely 
talking about it.
Our results carry some natural policy implications. They suggest that there are 
too few women working outside of the home because the labor market is in an 
equilibrium where social norms are misperceived—pluralistic ignorance—and that 
a  low-cost intervention correcting perceptions will lead to more women choosing 
jobs outside the home. To test this directly, we implemented an additional exper-
iment in a natural labor market setting, in partnership with a large Saudi survey 
company. The company embedded an experiment in their efforts to recruit enumer-
ators for a  one-day surveyor job. Using a sample of around 300 females that had 
previously indicated interest in working as a surveyor making calls from home, the 
company offered them the choice between that version of the job and a different 
version of the same job, interviewing respondents outside the home, face-to-face, 
in malls, for a 20 percent higher wage (with transportation costs additionally cov-
ered by the company). Before making the decision of what version of the job to 
take, the survey firm informed a random set of these  job-seekers of the findings 
from our national survey: “In a recent survey of a national sample of about 1,500 
married Saudi men aged  18–35, 82 percent agreed with the statement, “In my opin-
ion, women should be allowed to work outside the home.” This means that the 
vast majority of young married Saudi men support women working outside of the 
home.” We are thus able to embed a natural field experiment into an actual hiring 
process. Moreover, we hold fixed many characteristics of the job (the employer, the 
nature of the task broadly, including the survey they have to conduct), while only 
varying whether the job is to be performed at home or outside the home.
The evidence shows that a simple intervention in a natural setting like this can 
affect labor supply decisions. Information significantly increase the likelihood that 
 job-seekers choose the outside the home option, by 15 percentage points, which is an 
85 percent increase from the baseline likelihood of 18 percent in the control group. 
Using administrative data from the survey company, the likelihood of showing up 
to perform the job outside the home increased by 11 percentage points, a 74 percent 
increase from the 15 percent likelihood in the control group. Both effects are statisti-
cally significant. Note that, as in most hiring contexts, here the firm interacts directly 
with the potential employee, not their spouse. The female employee may of course 
relay information to her spouse, especially if the information is aligned with her 
preferences, but that is beyond the control of the firm. By communicating directly 
with the women (as opposed to men, as in our first experiment), this additional 
experiment thus provides a “proof of concept” on how our conceptual contribution 
can be easily actionable in terms of policy to fix labor market distortions arising 
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from misperceived norms. Indeed, by increasing the share of women willing to work 
outside the home, this type of intervention could expand the set of jobs available to 
women.
We contribute to a growing literature on social norms in economics. This liter-
ature has focused mostly on the  long-term persistence of cultural traits and norms 
(Fernández 2007, Giuliano 2007, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013, Voigtländer 
and Voth 2015). We study how  long-standing social norms can potentially change 
with the provision of information.9 We also contribute to a large literature on gender 
and labor markets (e.g., Bertrand 2011, Goldin 2014) by studying how social norms 
impact the share of women working outside the home, and our work is thus related 
to a growing literature on the effects of gender identity and norms on economic 
outcomes (see Akerlof and  Kranton 2000; Fernández, Fogli, and  Olivetti 2004; 
Fernández 2007; Eckel and  Grossman 2008; Fernández and  Fogli 2009; Jensen 
and Oster 2009; Dohmen et al. 2011; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Baldiga 
2014; Coffman 2014; Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015; Jayachandran 2015; Field 
et al. 2016; Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais 2017; Bernhardt et al. 2018; Bordalo 
et al. 2019; and McKelway 2019 for a discussion of the literature studying the role 
of social norms in explaining gender inequality in developing countries). Our paper 
relates to the work by Fernández (2013), which studies the role of cultural changes 
in explaining the large increases in married women’s labor force participation over 
the last century in the United States. Our work adds to a growing literature on social 
image concerns in economics. Individuals’ concerns about how they will be viewed 
by others has been shown to affect important decisions, from voting (DellaVigna 
et al. 2017,  Perez-Truglia and Cruces 2017) to charitable donations (DellaVigna, 
List, and Malmendier 2012) to schooling choices (Bursztyn and Jensen 2015). We 
show that Saudi men’s decisions to let their wives work outside the home are also 
affected by perceptions of the likelihood of judgment by others.
On the policy side, our results highlight how simple information provision might 
change perceptions of a society’s opinions on important topics, and how this might 
eventually lead to changes in behavior. Conducting opinion polls and diffusing infor-
mation about their findings could potentially be used to change important behaviors 
in some societies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the experimen-
tal design of our main experiment and the underlying conceptual framework in 
Section I. In Section II, we present and interpret the results from that experiment. 
In Section III, we present the design and results from the national online survey and 
discuss evidence from the Arab Barometer survey and an additional survey on the 
frequency of discussion of the topic of WWOH. In Section IV, we present the design 
and results from the surveyor recruitment experiment. Section V concludes.
9 Our paper also speaks to a recent theoretical literature on social norms (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2011, Ali 
and Bénabou 2016, and Acemoglu and Jackson 2017) by documenting how new information may lead to updates 
in perceptions of norms and fast changes in behavior.
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I. Main Experiment: Design
A. Experimental Design
To organize thoughts and help guide our design, we present a simple model of 
labor supply and stigma in online Appendix A, following the intuition from Bursztyn, 
Egorov, and Fiorin (forthcoming). If married Saudi men believe that a large share 
of other men are opposed to WWOH and if they care to a great extent about their 
social image, they may end up not letting their wives work outside the home, despite 
the fact that most would prefer to allow their wives to work if the behavior were not 
observable. However, our model predicts that correcting perceptions about the opin-
ions of others leads to drastic changes in the share of men willing to let their wives 
work outside the home.
Our experiment is comprised of two stages. We first conducted an experiment in 
the field to establish the effect of correcting participants’ perceptions of the beliefs 
of others on a contemporaneous decision to sign up their wife for a job matching ser-
vice. We then administered a  follow-up survey three to five months later to collect 
information on  longer-term labor supply outcomes.
Sample and Recruitment.—We partnered with the local branch of an international 
survey company and recruited 500 Saudi males between the ages of 18 and 35, living 
across Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as participants in our main experiment. We targeted 
this age bracket primarily for logistical reasons in the sense that this population 
would be likely to use smartphones and also the mobile application/service that was 
to be offered in the experiment.10 Participants were required to have at least some 
college education as well as access to a smartphone.11 We additionally restricted 
our recruitment to candidates who were married to ensure that participants would 
be able to make decisions regarding the labor market participation of their wives.
A recruiter database was used for initial contacts and further recruitment was 
conducted using a combination of snowball sampling and random street intercept. 
Participants were recruited from districts representing a range of  socio-economic 
classes. Anticipating that contacts from districts with lower average incomes would 
be more responsive to the offered incentives, these districts were oversampled.12
Participants were organized into 17 experimental sessions of 30 participants 
each.13
Importantly, participants for each session were recruited from the same geo-
graphic area, so that participants in the same session shared a common social 
10 An additional 120 participants were recruited for a pilot study consisting of 4 sessions which took place right 
before the start of the main experiment. The pilot study provided important logistical experience for survey facili-
tators and results were used to inform the final experimental design. Data from the pilot sessions are not included 
in the results presented.
11 Access to a smartphone was required not only so that participants could take the survey on their own devices, 
but also so we can ask participants whether they would like to sign up for a job matching service which includes a 
mobile app.
12 Participants were offered gift certificates with values ranging from  SAR100–150 ($ 26–40).
13 This means 510 total participants were expected, but only 500 completed the survey. Each session included 
two sequential survey links for each participant. The first part of the survey (corresponding to the first link) simply 
contained questions, the second part contained the informational conditions and the outcomes. The  ten-subject 
attrition in the experiment is driven by participants who failed to activate the second link.
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network. The average participant reported knowing 15 of the 29 other session par-
ticipants. Sessions were held in conference rooms located in a Riyadh hotel, admin-
istered over the course of a week starting October 9, 2017 and ending October 13, 
2017.
Main Experiment.—On their scheduled session date, participants arrived at the 
hotel. Upon arrival, participants were asked to provide their name, phone number, 
and  email on a  sign-in sheet before entering the designated session room. For each 
of the sessions, 5 rows of 6 chairs each were set up, with every other chair rotated to 
face the back of the room so that respondents’ survey responses would not be seen 
by nearby participants. A survey facilitator instructed participants to sit quietly until 
the start of the survey, at which point all participants were instructed to begin the 
survey simultaneously. Participants were not allowed to ask further questions after 
the start of the survey.
The survey itself was administered using the online survey software Qualtrics and 
was implemented in two parts.14 In the first part of the survey, we collected demo-
graphic information and elicited participants’ own opinions about a range of topics 
as well as their incentivized perceptions of others’ beliefs. In the second part of the 
survey, we randomized participants to our information provision treatment and mea-
sure outcomes. At the start of the survey period, a survey link to the first part of the 
survey was provided on a board at the front of the room. Participants were instructed 
to navigate to the link and take the survey on their personal smartphones.15
Since WWOH may be a sensitive issue for respondents, maintaining anonymity 
of responses is an important focus of our experimental design. While the names 
and phone numbers of all participants were collected on the  sign-in sheets, this 
identifying information was not collected in the survey itself. As a result, partici-
pants’ names and full phone numbers are not associated with their individual sur-
vey responses at any point in the data collection or analysis process.16 Instead, 
participants were asked only to provide the last three digits of their phone number. 
We then used these trailing digits to randomize participants to treatment condi-
tions, allowing us to recover a given participant’s assigned treatment status using 
only their last three phone number digits.17 In addition, this also allows us to link 
participants’  follow-up responses to their responses in the main experiment using 
only the combination of session number and these trailing digits.18 In sum, only the 
local surveyors collected a list with names and full phone numbers for each session. 
14 All the scripts from the different interventions are included in online Appendix C.
15 While the majority of participants were able to take the survey successfully on their own devices, tablets were 
provided to those who encountered technical difficulties.
16 Participants were asked to provide an  email address in order to receive a gift card reward for correctly guess-
ing others’ beliefs as well as the contact information of their wife if they choose to sign her up for a job matching 
service. All requests for identifying information occurred after the elicitation of private opinions and perceptions 
about the beliefs of others. Providing this contact information was also not required to complete the survey.
17 In particular, we electronically randomized treatment values to all possible combinations of three digits 
( 000–999) before the start of the experiment. Participants were then assigned to the treatment condition corre-
sponding to the treatment value  pre-assigned to the last three digits of their phone number.
18 Provided that trailing digits identify participants  one-to-one. Phone numbers are recorded on session specific 
 sign-in sheets so that we only need to worry about matching digits within sessions; in practice we find that 12 
 within-session pairs have matching trailing digits. Since we have no way to match the  follow-up responses of these 
respondents to their survey responses, we drop these respondents in the analysis of the  follow-up calls, and these 
participants were not recontacted.
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However, these surveyors were not able to link names to answers because they never 
had access to the data we collected through the online platform. Meanwhile, the 
researchers have access to the data, but do not have access to the participants’ con-
tact list—just the last three digits of their phone numbers. This anonymous design 
was chosen to facilitate the elicitation of honest opinions regarding WWOH.
In addition to using an anonymous online survey, we attempted to additionally 
reduce the scope for social desirability bias (SBS), by avoiding priming effects. 
The study was framed as a general labor market survey, with filler questions ask-
ing opinions on the employment insurance system, privileging Saudi nationals over 
foreigners into job vacancies, and the minimum wage level. In addition, no Western 
 non-Arab was present during the intervention.19 In Section III we present results 
from an alternative approach to eliciting opinions regarding WWOH using a method 
that provides a higher degree of plausible deniability: the “list experiment.” The very 
similar findings there indicate that SBS is not likely to be an issue in our setting.
After collecting basic demographic information, participants were presented with 
a series of statements. For each statement, we asked the respondent whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement. We began with three statements regarding 
the labor market in general. These statements were as follows:
 • In my opinion, Saudi nationals should receive privileged access to job vacan-
cies before expatriate workers.
 • In my opinion, the current unemployment insurance system (Haafez) is good 
for the economy.
 • In my opinion, the minimum wage for Saudis (SAR 3,000) should be kept at 
its current level.
We then presented two statements regarding the participation of women in the labor 
force:
 • In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside of the home.
 • In my opinion, a woman should have the right to work in  semi-segregated 
environments.
For each of the statements regarding WWOH as well as the statement about the 
minimum wage, participants were asked to estimate how many of the other 29 par-
ticipants they expected to agree with the statement.20 To incentivize participants to 
19 SBS would be an important issue if it leads to an upward bias in reported  pro-WWOH opinions. We note 
that it is unclear in what direction the bias would go: if participants are afraid of stigma associated with being 
 pro-WWOH in the case that their neighbors discover their true opinion, we would be underestimating the true level 
of support.
20 We asked two questions regarding WWOH, with the first one being our primary question and the second one 
added for robustness. In general, the object of interest was whether women should or should not be allowed (i.e., 
have the right) to work outside of home under current labor market conditions in Saudi Arabia. Conceptually, this 
right would arguably apply to any subset of circumstances. By contrast, we were not aiming to ask whether it is 
optimal for women to work outside of home under a particular circumstance, which would require qualifiers. To 
address the possibility that subjects misinterpret the first question, perhaps because it leaves it open whether men 
and women are fully integrated in workplaces (which is not the current situation), the second question refers to what 
is done in practice in Saudi Arabia today.  Semi-segregated workplaces have a separate section for women and men, 
which is required by law. We also replace the word “allowed” with “have the right,” to make sure there is no ambi-
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estimate the beliefs of others accurately, participants were told that the respondent 
with the closest guess would receive a $20 Amazon gift card code (distributed by 
 email after the end of the session).
This concluded the first part of the survey. Upon completing this part of the sur-
vey, participants were instructed to wait for the facilitator’s permission before con-
tinuing. The session facilitator was instructed to closely monitor the progress of the 
survey responses through the online platform. After it had been determined that all 
participants had completed the first part of the survey, participants were instructed 
to continue on to the second part of the survey by following a link provided on the 
end page of the first survey.
In the second part of the survey, one-half the participants were randomly assigned 
to a treatment condition. This randomization was conducted at the individual level, 
based on the last three digits of the respondents’ phone number (provided in the 
first part of the survey). In the treatment condition, participants were given feedback 
about the responses of the other session participants to the two statements about 
female labor participation. In particular, we provided treatment participants with 
charts embedded in the survey interface showing the proportion of respondents who 
reported agreeing and disagreeing with each statement in the first part of the survey. 
Participants assigned to the control group received no information.
Outcomes.—All participants were then asked to read a short passage about a 
Saudi start-up which provides an online platform aiming to connect  job-seeking 
Saudi women with employers. The start-up’s platform lists thousands of job oppor-
tunities for Saudi women, matching workers to jobs based on skills and interests. 
The informational passage contained basic information about the online platform as 
well as the company’s outreach and mentorship initiatives.
We then asked respondents to make an incentivized choice between receiving 
a $5 Amazon gift card and the opportunity to sign up their wives for access to the 
company’s platform and services. An important service in the case of  sign up is a 
weekly  email to be received listing a number of links to descriptions and application 
forms for postings of jobs outside the home for women in the participants’ areas. 
Participants who chose to sign up for the service were subsequently asked to provide 
the contact information of their wife.21 Note that since a participant’s wife’s even-
tual employment status is observable to peers, the observability of the  sign up choice 
itself does not matter independently, so we chose not to randomize the observability 
of the  sign up decision.
If participants who privately support WWOH underestimate the level of support 
for WWOH among others, they may incorrectly expect that signing up their wives 
for the job matching service is stigmatized. If this is indeed the case, participants 
who receive information correcting their beliefs about others’ support for WWOH 
(treatment) should exhibit a higher  sign up rate than participants who receive no 
information (control).
guity. As we will show below, we find very similar results regardless of the wording, indicating that we successfully 
measure the object of interest using our primary question.
21 In the results we present, as  pre-registered, those who do not provide their wife’s name and number (even if 
initially choosing the  sign up option) are treated as having chosen not to sign up. Results are almost identical if we 
include those as effectively signing up.
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At the end of our survey, we ask participants to estimate the percent of private 
sector firms in Saudi Arabia that have  semi-segregated work environments as a way 
to proxy for perceived market demand for female labor outside the home. Observing 
that our information provision has a positive effect on the expected percentage of 
firms with  semi-segregated environments would provide evidence consistent with 
perceived female labor demand being a function of perceived social norms regard-
ing WWOH. We use this information to assess the extent to which the decision to 
sign up is driven by changes in perceptions about labor demand—a different mech-
anism that is potentially relevant.
Figure 1 summarizes the design of the main experiment.
 Follow-Up Calls:  Longer-Term Outcomes.—We conducted  follow-up calls three 
to five months after the conclusion of the main experiment in order to collect 
 longer-term labor market outcomes.22 We partnered with the same survey company 
to  re-contact participants and conduct the  follow-up survey.
Participants were contacted using the phone numbers collected on the session 
 sign-in sheets during the main experiment. Participants who were not reached ini-
tially were called several times. At the beginning of each call, the surveyor reminded 
the respondent of his participation in the main experiment and provided further 
information about the  follow-up call. Participants who consented to participate in 
22  Follow-up calls began on January 10, 2018 and ended March 6, 2018.
Figure 1. Experimental Design: Main Experiment
Notes: Experimental design of the main experiment. Dashed lines indicate points in the survey flow where partici-
pants were instructed by the session facilitator and/or the survey instructions to wait for all session participants to 
be ready to start the next section before proceeding.
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the  follow-up were offered a payment of up to SAR 35 in phone credit for successful 
completion of the survey.
As noted above, we link the data collected in the  follow-up call to individual sur-
vey data in the main experiment, using the last three digits of the respondent’s phone 
number. Twelve pairs of respondents in the same experimental session provided 
identical trailing digits. We drop these participants from the subsequent  follow-up 
analysis since we cannot uniquely match them to their survey responses. Surveyors 
were able to recontact 82 percent of the original experimental subjects with unique 
trailing digits, and 98 percent of recontacted participants completed the survey. If 
one takes into account the twelve pairs of respondents with identical trailing digits 
at the session level (that is, 4.8 percent of the original sample), the total attrition 
rate is therefore 24 percent. We find no evidence of selective attrition overall, or 
within initial conditions (see online Appendix Tables B1 and B2), both based on 
observables and on the  sign up decision in the original experiment. We note that it is 
possible that some respondents changed their cell phone numbers in the four months 
between the experiment and the  follow-up survey, which could have contributed to 
the attrition rate (a number of numbers called were disconnected, which could have 
resulted from changes in telephone service or, alternatively, to participants provid-
ing incorrect numbers in during the experiment). In Section  IIA we provide Lee 
(2009) attrition bounds for our treatment effects.
In each  follow-up call, we collected a variety of outcomes related to the wife’s 
labor supply outcomes. We asked whether the wife was currently employed and if 
so, whether this job was outside the home. Jobs outside the home are our outcome 
of interest since the information intervention focuses on norms about working out-
side the home, and the  job matching service focuses on access to jobs of this kind. 
We also asked whether the wife was employed  three to four months ago (depending 
on the  follow-up survey data), i.e., at the time of the main experiment. We did this 
for two reasons. First, since we had already asked whether the wife was employed 
during the main experiment itself, asking the question again in the  follow-up allowed 
us to compare responses to the two questions as a sanity check for internal consis-
tency. Reassuringly, 94 percent of respondents respond consistently, giving the same 
answer to the question in both instances. Second, we were initially surprised that 
almost  two-thirds (65 percent) of respondents in the main experiment reported that 
their wife was employed. This high proportion led us to question whether some of 
the respondents’ wives were in fact working from home. We used the  follow-up 
survey as an opportunity to ask whether respondents’ wives were employed out-
side of home. We find that while 61 percent of the respondents in the  follow-up 
survey reported that their wives were working three months before (i.e., around the 
time of the original experiment), only 8 percent of them reported that their wives 
were then working outside the home.23 Participants were also given the option to 
answer an  open-ended question asking for their wives’ exact occupation. However, 
only a small share of participants provided an answer to this question, so we inter-
pret the numbers with caution. The most common occupation categories for wives 
23 In the larger, online national survey we conducted later, 43 percent of participants reported that their wife was 
currently working, while only 4 percent reported that their wife was working outside the home.
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 working from home were customer service: via phone calls (51 percent) and data 
entry (20 percent).
We then asked whether their wife participated in any job search activities in the 
last  three to four months. In particular, we collected information on whether their 
wife applied for a job during this period, interviewed for a job during this period, 
and whether she had any interviews currently scheduled. For all questions, affir-
mative answers were followed by a question asking whether the job of interest was 
outside the home. Next, we considered whether the information intervention in the 
original experiment may have had spillover effects on related behavioral outcomes. 
Taking advantage of the recent announcements lifting the ban on women’s right to 
drive, we posed a hypothetical question asking participants if they would be willing 
to sign up their wife for driving lessons if given the chance. Finally, we checked for 
persistence in the correction of perceptions of others’ beliefs induced by the infor-
mation provision treatment. In particular, we asked participants to guess how many 
people out of 30 randomly selected residents of their neighborhood would agree 
with each of the statements presented in the main experiment. Finding systematic 
differences in perceptions about norms between the treatment group and the control 
group would suggest that the information provision treatment had a persistent effect 
on participants’ beliefs about others. Since participants were recruited from the 
same neighborhoods within sessions, information spillovers from treatment to con-
trol participants could have washed out differential persistence in perceived norms.
Due to the number of outcomes we collect, we address the issue of multiple 
hypothesis testing by constructing an index pooling all of our collected outcomes 
following Kling, Liebman, and  Katz (2007). We discuss the construction of this 
index in Section IIA. We also adjust  p-values for multiple hypothesis testing follow-
ing the procedure developed by List, Shaikh, and Xu (2019).
II. Main Experiment: Results
A. Main Results
Misperceived Social Norms.—We start by describing the measured mispercep-
tion about social norms relating to WWOH. The average (median) guess is that 
63 percent (67 percent) of other session participants agree with the  pro-WWOH 
statement. The average level of agreement across all sessions is 87 percent, a num-
ber larger than the guesses of close to 70 percent of participants. Of course, the 
proper comparison is between a participant’s guess and the share agreeing in his 
session. In Figure 2, we calculate the wedge between the participant’s belief about 
the opinions of other session subjects and the actual opinions of all session partic-
ipants, and then plot the distribution of these wedges across all sessions. We find 
that 72 percent of participants strictly underestimate the support for WWOH among 
session participants (noting that these are individuals recruited from the same neigh-
borhoods), with an average wedge of 24 percentage points.24
24 Online Appendix Figure B1 displays very similar findings for the second question relating to WWOH 
(semi-segregated environments).
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To further examine what is underlying these guesses, we also asked people to 
assess, on a scale of  1–5, how confident they were with their guesses. We also asked 
how many other people they knew in the room. In online Appendix Figure B2, we 
show that more accurate guesses are significantly correlated with higher levels of 
confidence in the guess, and that knowing more people in the room is significantly 
correlated with both higher levels of confidence in the guess and with more accu-
rate guesses. These are just suggestive correlations, but they suggest that men par-
tially learn about the acceptability of female labor supply behavior from the people 
around them. We further investigate this hypothesis in Section IIIB.
The information collected in the  follow-up survey on whether wives were work-
ing outside the home at the time of the original experiment allows us to conduct 
another validity check: 100 percent of participants whose wife was working outside 
the home reported supporting WWOH outside the home. We also note that partic-
ipants supportive of WWOH outside the home (the vast majority of participants 
in the sample) have a significantly higher perception of support by other session 
subjects than participants opposed to WWOH outside the home (average guesses of 
18.7 versus 13.4, respectively, with p = 0.000).
Main Results (1 ):  Job Matching Service  Sign Up Rates.— We now turn to our 
experimental intervention correcting beliefs about the opinions of other participants. 
Table 1 provides evidence that individual characteristics are balanced across the two 
experimental conditions, confirming that the randomization was successful.
Figure 3 displays our main findings. In the control condition, 23.5 percent of par-
ticipants prefer to sign up their wives for the job service as opposed to taking the gift 
card payment. In the group receiving feedback on the responses of other participants 
Figure 2. Wedges in Perceptions of Others’ Beliefs: Main Experiment
Notes: The distribution of wedges in perceptions about the beliefs of others regarding whether women should be 
able to work outside the home. Wedges calculated as (the respondent’s guess about the percent of session partici-
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to the questions on support for WWOH, the  sign up rate goes up to 32.0 percent, a 
36.4 percent increase (the  p-value of a t-test of equality is 0.017). Table 2 displays 
the findings in regression format: column 1 replicates the findings from Figure 3. 
In column 2, we add session fixed effects. For robustness and potential efficiency 
gains, column 3 controls for baseline beliefs and column 4 includes additional indi-
vidual covariates. Results are unchanged across specifications. In this table and all 
Table 1—Summary Statistics: Main Experiment
All Control Treatment
Observations 500 247 253
Age 24.78 24.64 24.91
(4.21) (3.99) (4.41)
Number of children 1.71 1.64 1.77
(1.72) (1.70) (1.74)
College degree (%) 56.20 55.06 57.31
Employed (%) 86.60 87.45 85.77
Wife employed (%) 65.20 65.59 64.82
Wife working outside the home 
 (% retrospective follow-up)
8.40 7.89 8.90
Other participants known (%) 51.19 49.68 52.66
(38.24) (38.60) (37.92)
Other participants with mutual friends (%) 38.64 37.62 39.63
(34.94) (34.62) (35.29)
Notes: Baseline summary statistics of respondent characteristics in the main experiment. 
Summary statistics on wife working outside the home are from the self-reported labor supply 
status of participants’ wives three months before the experiment in the follow-up survey (sam-
ple size = 381).
Figure 3.  Job Matching Service  Sign Up: Main Experiment
Note:  Job matching service  sign up rates for respondents in the main experiment; 95 percent binomial proportion 
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tables which follow, in addition to  p -values from robust standard errors, we also 
present  p -values from wild cluster bootstrap standard errors (where we cluster at the 
session level) and permutation tests for relevant coefficients.25
Main Results (2 ):  Longer-Term Outcomes.—We now evaluate the  longer-term 
effects of the information intervention (three to five months later). Figure 4 displays 
the results. We first present the impact of the original treatment on three  self-reported 
 labor-supply outcomes: whether or not the participant’s wife applied for a job out-
side the home since the original intervention, whether or not she interviewed for a 
job outside the home during this period and whether or not she is currently employed 
outside the home. Across all outcomes, we see increases stemming from the original 
treatment, though this difference is significant only for the first two outcomes. The 
percentage of wives who applied for a job outside the home during the time frame of 
interest goes up from 5.8 percent to 16.2 percent, a 180 percent increase (the  p-value 
of a t-test of equality is 0.001). Regarding interviews for this type of job, the share 
increases from 1.1 percent to 5.8 percent (  p-value = 0.006). Rates of employment 
outside the home go up from 7.4 percent to 9.4 percent (  p-value = 0.235).
We also examine whether the information provided might lead to changes in 
other behaviors related to women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Figure  4 shows that 
the share of husbands who report in a hypothetical question that they would 
sign their wives up for driving lessons goes up from 65.2 percent to 76.4 percent 
(  p-value = 0.008). This suggests that the effects of the information intervention 
25 We use wild cluster bootstrap standard errors because of the small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller 2008). We use permutation tests due to potentially small sample sizes.
Table 2—Wedges in Perceptions of Others’ Beliefs: Main Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (β ) 0.0853 0.0876 0.0899 0.0898
(0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0395) (0.0404)
Constant 0.235 0.132 −0.156 −0.131
(0.0270) (0.0739) (0.0970) (0.186)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.033 0.028 0.023 0.027
p-value: wild bootstrap 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.008
p-value: permutation test 0.036 0.038 0.024 0.025
Session fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Baseline beliefs ✓ ✓
Controls ✓
Observations 500 500 500 491
R2 0.00907 0.0696 0.108 0.116
Notes: Column 1 reports estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator for whether the 
respondent signed their wife up for the job matching service on a treatment dummy. Column 2 
includes session fixed effects. Column 3 controls for the respondent’s own opinions and per-
ceptions of others’ beliefs at baseline regarding the labor market statements described in the 
main experiment. Column 4 adds socioeconomic controls for age, education, employment sta-
tus (of both respondent and wife), number of children and the share of people in the session 
room the respondent reported knowing and having mutual friends with. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Reported p-values for wild bootstrap and permutation tests derived 
from running 1,000 replications in each case. Wild bootstrap clustered at the session level.
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extend beyond behaviors narrowly associated with WWOH outside the home, and 
may act more generally with respect to norms about women’s rights in Saudi Arabia.
We next assess whether the original treatment produced a persistent change in 
perceived norms (and whether spillovers via subsequent communication with the 
control group undid the original intervention). To that end, we asked participants to 
provide an  unincentivized guess on the number of 30 randomly selected people from 
their neighborhood they think would agree with the same  pro-WWOH statements 
from the original experiment. We find evidence of a persistent change in perceptions 
by treated relative to control participants: the average guessed share for “working 
outside the home” increases from 43.9 percent to 56.6 percent ( p-value = 0.000). 
These findings also suggest that the intervention updated beliefs about neighbor’s 
opinions in general, not just regarding responses by other session participants.26
To deal with the potential issue of multiple hypothesis testing, we follow Kling, 
Liebman, and  Katz (2007), and construct an index pooling all six of our used 
26 In online Appendix Figure B3 we show that there was no treatment effect on the filler question regarding the 
opinions of neighbors on the current level of the minimum wage. Although there is a theoretical possibility that 
subjects could have updated their views on the opinions of others regarding issues not directly related to gender 
issues in the labor market—but labor market issues more broadly—we find no evidence to that effect.
Figure 4.  Long-Term Labor Supply Outcomes:  Follow-Up
Notes:  Self-reported labor supply outcomes of participants’ wives in the  follow-up survey; 95 percent binomial pro-
portion confidence intervals;  p -value calculated from testing for equality of proportions. Panels  A–C refer exclu-
sively to job opportunities outside the home.
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 outcomes.27 The index is  (1/6) ∑ k=1 
6 (k −  q k )/ σ k , where  k indexes an outcome, 
and  q k and  σ k are the mean and standard deviation of that outcome for participants 
originally in the control group. In addition, we display  p-values adjusting for mul-
tiple hypothesis testing following the procedure developed by List, Shaikh, and Xu 
(2019). Finally, we provide Lee (2009) attrition bounds for our treatment effects.
Table 3 presents the results in regression format, with and without controls.
We can further examine the  longer-term effects of the information provided on 
perceptions of social norms. Online Appendix Figure B4 provides visual evidence 
27 The index here includes six outcomes (interviews scheduled is included in the index but not in the tables 
since only 1 person had an interview scheduled). Results are unchanged if we include as a seventh outcome guesses 
about opinions regarding the statement on  semi-segregated environments, since the answers were very correlated 
for both types of guesses.













Panel A. No controls
Treatment (β ) 0.249 0.0206 0.104 0.0471 0.112 0.128
(0.0495) (0.0285) (0.0317) (0.0185) (0.0463) (0.0267)
Constant −0.119 0.0737 0.0579 0.0105 0.653 0.439
(0.0272) (0.0190) (0.0170) (0.00742) (0.0346) (0.0195)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.000 0.471 0.001 0.011 0.016 0.000
p-value: wild bootstrap 0.000 0.543 0.032 0.010 0.019 0.001
p-value: permutation test 0.000 0.593 0.002 0.017 0.009 0.000
p-value: L-S-X MHT correction — 0.484 0.003 0.050 0.039 0.000
Lee attrition bounds
Lower bound 0.238 0.014 0.101 0.046 0.092 0.119
(0.0576) (0.0288) (0.0314) (0.0181) (0.0564) (0.0350)
Upper bound 0.276 0.033 0.120 0.056 0.111 0.138
(0.0592) (0.0532) (0.0555) (0.0166) (0.0500) (0.0392)
Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381
R2 0.0626 0.00137 0.0278 0.0168 0.0151 0.0571
Panel B. Session fixed effects, baseline beliefs, and socioeconomic controls
Treatment (β ) 0.276 0.0223 0.115 0.0469 0.125 0.144
(0.0528) (0.0282) (0.0332) (0.0182) (0.0475) (0.0268)
Constant −0.141 0.0545 −0.0262 0.0222 0.882 0.310
(0.210) (0.137) (0.146) (0.0795) (0.225) (0.114)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.000 0.429 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.000
p-value: wild bootstrap 0.000 0.438 0.026 0.001 0.022 0.002
p-value: permutation test 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.000
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375
R2 0.164 0.0947 0.166 0.117 0.128 0.229
Notes: Each column reports estimates from OLS regression of the outcome indicated by the column on a treatment 
dummy. The Kling-Liebman-Katz index, defined in the text, is constructed from all six tested outcomes includ-
ing those not reported in the table. Panel A includes no controls while Panel B adds session fixed effects, baseline 
beliefs (own opinions and perceptions of others’ beliefs) and socioeconomic controls for age, education, employ-
ment status (of both respondent and wife), number of children, and the share of people in the session room the 
respondent reported knowing and having mutual friends with. In panel A, L-S-X MHT correction refers to the 
multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in List, Shaikh, and Xu (2019). Robust standard errors reported in 
parenthesis. Reported p-values for wild bootstrap and permutation tests derived from running 1,000 replications in 
each case. Wild bootstrap clustered at the (main-experiment) session level.
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that for control group participants, higher beliefs about the share of  pro-WWOH ses-
sion participants are associated with higher beliefs about the share of  pro-WWOH 
neighbors in the  follow-up survey (the effect is significant at the 1 percent level). 
The figure also shows that the levels of beliefs in the  follow-up survey are higher for 
treated participants, and that the relationship between prior and posterior beliefs is 
(significantly) flatter for treated participants. These results suggest that the treatment 
indeed updated priors about neighbors’ opinions and that treated participants used 
the signal from the treatment to override their priors. Online Appendix Table B3 
displays the results in regression format with session fixed effects and controls.
B. Heterogeneity by Direction of Priors’ Update
We move beyond the average effects of the information provision and now ana-
lyze heterogeneous effects by the direction (and size) of priors’ updating. Figure 5 
provides the raw averages and Table 4 displays regression results. For those who 
originally underestimated the true share of session participants agreeing with the 
statement regarding women’s right to work outside the home, we observe a large 
increase in  sign up rates for the job matching service when information is pro-
vided: the share signing up increases from 21.4 percent in the control group to 
33.5  percent in the treatment group (a 57  percent increase,  p-value = 0.004). 
For those who originally overestimated the true share of session subjects agree-
ing with the statement, the baseline  sign up rate is higher in the control group 
(30.9  percent), which is by itself consistent with the hypothesis of a role of 
Figure 5.  Job Matching Service  Sign Up, Heterogeneity by Wedge: Main Experiment
Notes:  Job matching service  sign up rates for respondents with  non-positive and positive wedges in perceptions 
about the beliefs of others regarding whether women should be able to work outside the home. Wedges calculated as 
(the respondent’s guess about the percent of session participants agreeing with the statement) − (the true percent 
of session participants agreeing with the statement); 95 percent binomial proportion confidence intervals.  p -value 
calculated from testing for equality of proportions.
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 perceived social norms affecting labor supply decisions for their wives. The effect 
of the intervention is no longer significant for that group, and is in fact directionally 
negative (albeit small). We note that the interaction term in the regression including 
the whole sample (that is, the treatment interacted with a dummy on the sign of the 
wedge) is not significant at conventional levels (the  p-value of the interaction in 
the regression without additional covariates is 0.115, while it is 0.204 for the full 
specification).28 Interestingly, the  sign up rate among control participants with pos-
itive wedges is very similar (and not statistically different) from the  sign up rate in 
the treatment group, which provides correlational evidence from the control group 
consistent with our hypothesis that perceptions of social norms matter for the  sign 
up decision. The evidence on heterogeneous updating for the  longer-term outcomes 
is less conclusive, and is shown in online Appendix Tables B4 (without controls) 
and B5 (full specification).29
28 Also note that, as discussed before, participants with larger negative wedges are more likely to be personally 
opposed to WWOH, which in principle would reduce the scope for an effect of the information provision to them. 
When we restrict the regression to those who reported supporting WWOH, the interaction term yields  p-values of 
0.099 (no additional controls) and 0.209 (full specification).
29 We find similar treatment effects on  sign up rates for participants with fewer or more social connections in 
the original experimental session. We note though that a priori, it is unclear whether the effects should be stronger 
or weaker according to the number of social connections: the treatment might be less informative because socially 
connected participants might already have better guesses about the opinions of others, but those participants might 
potentially care more about the opinions of the other subjects, thus strengthening the treatment.
Table 4—Job Matching Service Sign Up: Heterogeneity by Wedge: Main Experiment
Wedge ≤ 0 Wedge > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (β ) 0.122 0.122 0.127 0.125 −0.0274 −0.0383 −0.0391 −0.0252
(0.0459) (0.0457) (0.0450) (0.0463) (0.0827) (0.0883) (0.0919) (0.114)
Constant 0.214 0.0511 −0.202 −0.251 0.309 0.315 0.711 0.946
(0.0297) (0.0710) (0.117) (0.204) (0.0628) (0.162) (0.659) (0.882)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.741 0.665 0.671 0.825
p-value: wild bootstrap 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.735 0.689 0.728 0.854
p-value: permutation test 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.850 0.644 0.651 0.826
Session fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Baseline beliefs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Observations 374 374 374 365 126 126 126 126
R2 0.0186 0.0943 0.135 0.150 0.000890 0.136 0.221 0.271
Notes: Wedge for the given statement (whether women should be able to work outside the home) calculated as (the 
respondent’s guess about the number of session participants agreeing with the statement) − (the true number of 
session participants agreeing with the statement). Column 1 reports OLS estimates from regressing an indicator 
for whether the respondent signed their wife up for the job matching service on a treatment dummy restricted to 
respondents with non-positive wedge (those underestimating the progressivism of the other participants). Column 5 
reports estimates from the same specification restricted instead to respondents with positive wedge. Columns 2 
and 6 include session fixed effects. Columns 3 and 7 additionally control for respondents’ opinions and perceptions 
of others’ beliefs at baseline regarding the labor market statements described in the main experiment. Columns 4 
and 8 add socioeconomic controls for age, education, employment status (of both respondent and wife), number of 
children and the share of people in the session room the respondent reported knowing and having mutual friends 
with. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Reported p-values for wild bootstrap and permutation tests 
derived from running 1,000 replications in each case. Wild bootstrap clustered at the session level.
3017BURSZTYN ET AL.: MISPERCEIVED SOCIAL NORMSVOL. 110 NO. 10
If one assumes that treated participants use the numbers given by the informa-
tion provision as their posterior beliefs about the other session subjects, we can 
compute a continuous measure of belief update during the experiment. For control 
participants, this update is equal to zero. For treatment participants, it is equal to the 
negative of their “wedge.” We can then evaluate the impact of the size of the prior 
updating on the  sign up decision, as displayed in Table 5. Note that unlike in the 
other tables, we control for participants’ own views on WWOH, their beliefs about 
other session subjects, and their confidence in their own guesses, since conceptually 
all these variables should matter for a given prior updating level. We find that higher 
levels of prior updating lead to significantly higher  sign up rates. For example, using 
the specification in column 1, a positive update in prior corresponding to one stan-
dard deviation of the wedge in the treatment group causally leads to a 6.9 percentage 
point increase in the job matching service  sign up rate. In online Appendix Table B6, 
we provide suggestive evidence that higher levels of updating also lead to larger 
changes in the  longer-term outcomes.
C. Interpreting the Results
Understanding the  Longer-Term Effects.—It is difficult to separate the extent to 
which the  longer-term effects are driven by the higher rate of access to the job ser-
vice versus a persistent change in perceptions of the stigma associated with WWOH. 
The fact that we observe a persistent treatment effect on beliefs about neighbors 
Table 5—Effect of Belief Update on Job Matching Service 
Sign Up: Main Experiment
(1) (2) (3)
Update ( −Wedge ×  1 Treatment ; β ) 0.00758 0.00648 0.00682
(0.00334) (0.00342) (0.00352)
Constant −0.0255 −0.116 −0.111
(0.0716) (0.0979) (0.182)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.023 0.058 0.053
p-value: wild bootstrap 0.008 0.015 0.026
p-value: permutation test 0.028 0.069 0.069
Baseline beliefs and confidence ✓ ✓ ✓
Session fixed effects ✓ ✓
Controls ✓
Observations 500 500 491
R2 0.0270 0.0798 0.0926
Notes: Column  1 reports estimates from an OLS regression on the update in belief about 
the support of others induced by the information treatment (for women working outside the 
home), controlling for own baseline opinions, perceptions of others’ beliefs, and confidence in 
beliefs about others (for the question asking whether women should be able to work outside 
the home). The update measure is given by minus the wedge for those in the treatment condi-
tion and equals 0 for those in the control condition. Column 2 includes session fixed effects. 
Column 3 additionally includes socioeconomic controls for age, education, employment sta-
tus (of both respondent and wife), number of children, and the share of people in the session 
room the respondent reported knowing and having mutual friends with. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Reported p-values for wild bootstrap and permutation tests derived 
from running 1,000 replications in each case. Wild bootstrap clustered at the session level.
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measured in the  follow-up survey and on the (reported) willingness to sign up 
one’s wife for driving lessons (that is, a different, related outcome) suggests that 
the  longer-term effects on job search behavior might not be entirely mechanically 
driven by the job matching service alone.
One might wonder if there could have been informational spillovers between 
treatment and control participants. These participants often reported knowing each 
other and could have discussed the information given to them after the main exper-
iment. This is particularly related to our hypothesis; if perceived social sanctions 
associated with WWOH have been reduced, some participants would be more open 
to discussing the topic with their neighbors or friends. While we observe persistent 
differences in beliefs about others in the  follow-up survey, we have no way of know-
ing if the differences between control and treatment groups would have been even 
larger in the absence of potential spillovers.30
Interestingly, we find significant effects for outcomes (applying and interviewing 
for jobs outside the home) that are not easily observable (when compared to work-
ing outside the home itself). It is possible that the difference in beliefs about others 
between the two conditions would have been smaller if control participants started 
observing more women working outside the home. Unfortunately, we do not have 
the data to test this hypothesis.31
Signaling Labor Demand.—The channel we have in mind to explain our results 
is an update in the perceived social sanctions associated with having a wife working 
outside the home. However, updating one’s beliefs about what others think regard-
ing WWOH might also turn on a potential additional channel, since this update may 
also lead to learning about the labor demand side. Subjects may think “If so many 
people, in fact, support WWOH, then there are probably many firms willing to hire 
women for jobs outside the home.” This is an interesting alternative mechanism and 
could explain our findings if (i) inducing positive updates in perceptions about other 
participants’ opinions leads to positive updates in perceptions about the availability 
of jobs for women, and (ii) this second update matters for the  sign up decision (i.e., 
participants originally believed labor demand was a constraint). In online Appendix 
Table B7, we find that the treatment leads to a small (and generally  not-significant) 
increase in participants’ beliefs about the percentage of  private-sector firms in Saudi 
Arabia with  semi-segregated environments. In online Appendix Table B8, we show 
that once we include covariates, there is no correlation in the control group between 
participants’ perception of firms’ willingness to hire women and participants’ 
30 We find similar treatment effects on  longer-term outcomes for participants with fewer or more social con-
nections in the original experimental session, suggesting that informational spillovers alone might not have been 
enough to induce more job search among control participants’ wives. Possible reasons for this pattern include (i) the 
other, known participants were not very close friends but their opinions are still relevant signals about the relevant 
peer group in the neighborhood; (ii) perhaps one has no economic incentives to tell one’s friends until one’s wife 
gets a job because communicating to others would increase competition for the same jobs; (iii) if treated partici-
pants now think that WWOH is socially desirable and a symbol of status, they may want to be the first to have an 
employed wife (to distinguish themselves), or derive utility from being the “leader” and having others follow them.
31 An interesting question is the extent to which our results are driven by households without children—given that 
childcare could be an additional obstacle for women to take a job outside the home. In online Appendix Figures B5, 
B6, and B7, we present our results in terms of  sign up rates,  longer-term outcomes, and the outcomes for the recruit-
ment experiment, separately for women with or without children. We do not see any striking pattern of heterogeneity 
on that dimension, though for some of the outcomes the effects seem weaker for households with children.
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 decision to sign up for the  job matching service. We therefore believe that this alter-
native mechanism is not driving our findings.
III. National Surveys and Discussion of Misperceptions Drivers
A. First National Survey
We now examine results from an anonymous, online survey with a larger, national 
sample of about 1,500 married Saudi men that used the same platform and had the 
same layout as the original experiment. The goal of this additional survey is  twofold. 
First, we assess the external validity of the finding that most Saudi men privately 
support WWOH while failing to understand that others do. Second, we examine 
whether social desirability bias/experimenter demand effects could have been a 
driver of the misperception finding in the main experiment.
Survey Design.—The sample of survey takers was recruited through the same sur-
vey company as before and the (visually identical) survey was administered online 
through Qualtrics. As in the main experiment, we restricted the survey to married 
Saudi males between the ages of 18 and 35. The final sample of participants was 
designed to be a nationally representative sample of the targeted demographic cat-
egory, enabling us to provide evidence of the external validity of our main finding.
After signing an online consent form, participants were asked the same set of 
demographic questions as in the main experiment. Then, we departed from the 
design of the main experiment by implementing a list experiment to introduce plau-
sible deniability to our elicitation of individual beliefs. In a list experiment, par-
ticipants are randomly assigned to either a control group or to a treatment group. 
In the control group, participants are presented with a list of statements or policy 
positions that are contentious but not stigmatized. In the treatment group, partici-
pants are presented with an identical list of items but also an additional, potentially 
stigmatized item for which the experimenter would like to elicit beliefs. Participants 
in both conditions are then asked to indicate how many of the statements they agree 
with. The true degree of support for the item of interest at the sample level can then 
be inferred by comparing the average number of agreements in the treatment group 
with the average number of agreements in the control group.
This design allows the experimenter to ask participants only how many of the 
statements or policy positions in a given list they agree with rather than needing 
to know which items they support in particular. In our case, as long as participants 
do not disagree with all the  non-WWOH statements, the list experiment provides 
plausible deniability to those who do not support WWOH and might otherwise be 
affected by social desirability bias.
We operationalized the list experiment in our online survey as follows. Participants 
in the control group were presented with a list of three general statements about the 
labor market (the same statements used in the main experiment).32 These statements 
were chosen to be contentious but not stigmatized:
32 The ordering of the statements in the list was randomized for both the treatment and the control groups.
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 • In my opinion, Saudi nationals should receive privileged access to job vacan-
cies before expatriate workers.
 • In my opinion, the current unemployment insurance system (Haafez) is good 
for the economy.
 • In my opinion, the minimum wage for Saudis (SAR 3,000) should be kept at 
its current level.
Participants were asked to read all three statements carefully and to indicate the 
number of statements (from 0 to 3) that they agreed with. Note that we did not ask 
participants which of the statements they agreed with, only how many.
In the treatment group, participants were presented with the same list of state-
ments with the single addition of the statement of interest regarding WWOH that is 
potentially stigmatized:
 • In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside of the home.
Treatment participants were likewise asked to indicate the number of statements 
(from 0 to 4) that they agreed with. We recover the true share of participants sup-
porting WWOH by subtracting the average number of stated agreements to the three 
 non-WWOH statements (given by the control group mean) from the average num-
ber of stated agreements to the list including the WWOH statement (given by the 
treatment group mean).
Next, we directly elicited private opinions about WWOH by asking participants 
in the control group whether they agreed with the statement about the right of 
women to work outside the home. This enables us to compare, at the  sample-level, 
the stated degree of support for WWOH with the degree of support for WWOH 
inferred using the list experiment. Since the latter should be much less susceptible 
to social desirability bias, this comparison reveals the magnitude of any potential 
social desirability bias effects.
Finally, we ask participants to gauge the responses of other participants to the 
statement about WWOH. In the control condition, participants are asked to estimate 
the percentage of other participants who reported agreeing with the same statement. 
Participants are informed that the study consists of a nationally representative sam-
ple of 1,500 married Saudi males aged  18–35. As in the main experiment, this elic-
itation was conducted in an incentivized manner—participants were informed that 
the respondent with the most accurate guess would receive a $50 Amazon gift card.
Since we do not directly elicit private beliefs about the WWOH statement in 
the treatment condition we cannot elicit participants’ beliefs about others in the 
same way (without revealing the existence of our treatment and control conditions). 
Instead, we ask participants to estimate the percentage of other participants who 
would privately agree with the WWOH statement.33 Participants are again informed 
about the characteristics of the sample. Comparing the distribution of these esti-
mates of the true opinions of others to the distribution of estimates of the answers 
33 This was done without incentives since there is no obvious measure of accuracy available.
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of others allows us to examine whether guesses about the answers of others are 
distorted by expectations that others might answer strategically.
A pilot sample of 100 participants was launched on February 15, 2018 and con-
cluded on February 16, 2018. No changes were made to the experimental design 
after reviewing the pilot results. The survey was then administered to the rest of 
the sample (1,496 survey participants, 1,460 of which completed the whole survey) 
starting on February 17, 2018 and concluding on March 2, 2018. We drop the data 
from the pilot in our analysis. Online Appendix Table B9 displays summary statis-
tics for the national survey sample and shows that covariates are balanced across 
conditions.
Results.—We first assess the external validity of the finding that most Saudi men 
privately support WWOH while failing to understand that others do. As displayed 
in Figure 6, in this broader, more-representative sample, 82 percent of men agree 
with the same statement on WWOH used in the main experiment regarding working 
outside the home. When incentivized to guess the responses of other survey respon-
dents, 92 percent of them underestimate the true share. This number is higher than 
in the experimental sample, perhaps because they are no longer being asked about 
their own neighbors’ opinions. That said, the average wedge is similar to before: 
25 percentage points.
Next, we use the survey to examine whether social desirability bias/experimenter 
demand effects could have been a driver of the misperception finding in the main 
experiment. These results are also shown in Figure 6. By subtracting the average 
number of agreements in the control list from the treatment list, we get the share 
Figure 6. Misperceptions about Others’ Beliefs: National Survey
Notes: CDF of respondents’ guesses about the share of other participants in the national survey agreeing with the 
statement that women should be able to work outside the home. Vertical lines show the true proportion of respon-
dents agreeing with the statement. In the treatment group, private beliefs are elicited using a list experiment. The 
true proportion of respondents agreeing to the statement in the treatment group is then inferred by subtracting the 
average number of agreements in the control list from the treatment list (a list of statements identical to the control 
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of respondents who agree with the statement of interest, but under response condi-
tions with a higher degree of plausible deniability. We find a very similar share of 
80 percent, indicating that social desirability bias/experimenter demand effects are 
not a driver of the finding. Finally, we examine whether individuals might be incor-
rectly expecting others to strategically respond to the WWOH agreement question, 
which would distort guesses about others, since the question asked about how others 
answered the question. We find that beliefs about other participants’ true opinions 
were extremely similar to the guesses about others’ answers.
Finally, we again find that more accurate guesses (for both types of questions 
regarding others) are correlated with more confidence in the guess, as depicted in 
online Appendix Figure B8.
Evidence from the Arab Barometer.—As a last check on the external validity of 
the fact we document, we find that the share of Saudi men supportive of WWOH 
outside the home is also extremely similar when using the nationally representative 
sample from the wave of the Arab Barometer survey containing that question for 
Saudi Arabia ( 2010–2011). Out of approximately 700 male respondents, 77 per-
cent agree with the statement, “A married woman can work outside the home if she 
wishes.” Among male respondents aged  18–35 (the age bracket in our study), the 
share is 79 percent.34 The Arab Barometer survey also allows us to establish that 
older men are also supportive of WWOH outside the home; among those over 35, 
the share agreeing with that statement is 74 percent. Figure 7 displays the share of 
men supportive of WWOH outside the home in the different samples discussed in 
this paper.
B. Discussion: Why Are Social Norms Misperceived?
Our results paint a consistent picture. When social norms in the labor market are 
misperceived, simple information provision can affect labor supply decisions. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, most people perceive society to be more conservative than it 
really is. As a result, too few women work outside of home.
This begs the question, why is society in a misperceptions equilibrium to begin 
with? It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide sharp answers here, but one 
may speculate that a lack of communication between individuals in society is a 
likely underlying mechanism. This mechanism may be particularly relevant if mass 
media does not appropriately convey to the public what values dominate in soci-
ety. In any case, our data points to  individual-to-individual communication being a 
relevant underlying mechanism. In the first experiment, the more men in the room 
the participants know, the more correct perceptions they have (see online Appendix 
Figure B2). This is consistent with better information arising from communication 
with people you know. However, this correlation may also simply reflect homophily. 
That is, it is easier to predict the beliefs of people whom you know because they are 
more likely to be like you, even in the absence of communication on the issue.
34 The question in the Arab Barometer survey is not worded exactly the same as in our survey, and so partici-
pants may interpret its meaning slightly differently. Also, participants were asked to report their extent of agreement: 
strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree. We pool the first two to create the indicator of agreement.
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To probe more directly for lack of communication being an important driver of 
misperceptions, we use data from a separate online survey, implemented in January 
and February 2020, with a national sample of married Saudi men aged  18–45 (we 
increased the upper bound on age to make it easier to reach out to a larger sample). 
A total of 703 individuals were surveyed (online Appendix Table B10 presents sam-
ple characteristics). When asked whether women should be allowed to work outside 
the home, the responses mirror those of the larger national survey: 84 percent are 
in favor, but the average perception is that 56 percent are in favor; 82 percent of the 
sample underestimates the level of support. In the age bracket  18–35, the numbers 
are very similar: 83 percent are in favor, the average perception is 54 percent, and 
84 percent underestimate support for WWOH.35
35 To rule out that some people mechanically, or mindlessly, answer positively to a normative question regard-
less of its meaning, in this survey we randomize two versions of how the question was asked. One-half of the sample 
get the standard question and the other half were asked “Which of the following two statements do you agree with? 
Figure 7. Support for Women Working Outside the Home across Samples
Notes: Comparison of support for female labor force participation in experimental data and the nationally repre-
sentative Arab Barometer. In the first three experimental conditions, participants were presented with the following 
statement, “In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside the home.” The last experimental condition 
randomly presents one of two versions of the question. One-half of the sample gets the standard statement as above 
and the other half were asked “which of the following two statements do you agree with? 1. In my opinion, women 
should be allowed to work outside of the home. 2. In my opinion, women should not be allowed to work outside of 
the home.” The corresponding statement presented in the Arab Barometer is “a married woman can work outside 
the home if she wishes.” The plot shows the percentage of respondents agreeing to the presented statement in each 
case. In the Arab Barometer survey data, we define the agreement indicator by pooling respondents who reported 
“agreeing” or “strongly agreeing.” Ntnl. Svy. (Direct) refers to the direct elicitation of beliefs conducted in our 
own nationally representative online survey conducted in early 2018. Ntnl. Svy. (List) refers to the level of support 
inferred from the list experiment in the same survey by subtracting the average number of agreements in the con-
trol group from the average number in the treatment group. Online Svy. 2 refers to the level of support in the second 
national survey conducted in early 2020 (we pool the answers from the two types of ways the question was asked); 
95 percent confidence intervals. Confidence interval for the level of support inferred from the list experiment calcu-
lated by taking the variance of the treatment: control estimator to be the sum of the variance of the sample mean in 
the control group and the variance of the sample mean in the treatment group.
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It is worth noting that the results in this survey with respect to private opinions regard-
ing WWOH, and beliefs about the opinions of other people, are similar to our other 
samples. Put differently, as online Appendix Figure B9 makes clear, when we examine 
the degree of misperceptions across different samples and measurement approaches, a 
very consistent picture emerges: the vast majority underestimate the degree of support 
for WWOH and the average wedge is around  25–28 percentage points.
Now, most importantly, in this survey another question is added, “Think of the 
topic on whether women should be allowed to work outside of the home. Is this a 
topic that is [very often, often, sometimes, rarely, very rarely] discussed among your 
male friends and relatives?” First, as seen in panel A of Figure 8, 59 percent of the 
sample report to discuss the topic either rarely or very rarely (38 percent report to 
discuss it very rarely). Moreover, if lack of communication helps fuel mispercep-
tions, one would expect a correlation between the frequency of communication and 
perceptions. Panel B of Figure 8 plots the relationship. Among those that very rarely 
discuss the issue with their male friends and relatives, the average wedge is 40 per-
cent, while it is 4 percent for those who communicate very often. The relationship 
between misperceptions and frequency of communication is essentially monotonic 
across the five frequencies.
This evidence, while suggestive, is thus consistent with a lack of communication 
driving misperceptions. That said, it is only a simple correlation between actions 
and beliefs. It is entirely possible that the correlation reflects a form of reverse cau-
sality: if I perceive most others to be conservative, so that I (falsely) fear a social 
stigma from conveying that I am a progressive, then I may refrain from discussing 
1. In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside of the home. 2. In my opinion, women should not be 
allowed to work outside of the home.” We get very similar levels of support regardless of how the question is asked, 
with 86 percent support in the first version, and 82 percent support in the second version.
Figure 8. Frequency of Discussion and Perceived Support for WWOH: Second National Survey
Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of answers to the question, “Think of the topic on whether women should be 
allowed to work outside of the home. Is this a topic that is discussed [frequency] among your male friends and rel-
atives?” Panel B shows the average perceptions of support by others for women working outside the home for each 
category of answers to this question. The dashed horizontal line shows the true proportion of respondents agreeing 
with the statement in the sample; 95 percent confidence intervals. The data are from the online survey conducted 
in early 2020.
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the topic at all. This is a possibility, at least if people dislike lying about their own 
views to their male friends and relatives. Note that this interpretation is also con-
sistent with the logic of pluralistic ignorance. In this case, it is easy to see how 
misperceptions may persist for a long time, but it also means that we are back to 
the original question of why misperceptions exist to begin with. Ultimately, without 
experimental data that tackles the question directly, it is very difficult to pin down 
the underlying mechanism driving misperceptions. In our view, it is a fruitful avenue 
for future research, in the present context and beyond.
IV. Surveyor Recruitment Experiment
A. Design
We partnered with a large Saudi survey company and embedded an experiment in 
their recruitment of temporary enumerators, conducted in January and February 2020. 
The company first contacted women in their database (across three cities: Jeddah, 
Riyadh, and Dammam), following a script we provided them to have harmonized 
demographic information, and to confirm their interest in an opportunity for a tempo-
rary ( one-day) enumerator job, calling respondents from home. The pay rate is SAR 
25 per hour (or 200 Saudi Riyals per day), the standard one for this type of work.
Our experimental intervention occurred during a second call to women who had 
confirmed their interest in the first call. In the second call, the company offered to 
291 women, aged  18–45, the choice between
 • performing the job from home at the previously agreed upon pay rate of SAR 
200 per day;
 • performing the same enumerator job (for the same survey), but conducting 
 face-to-face interviews in shopping malls. This second option offers a pay 
that is 20 percent higher, SAR 240 per day, and on top of that, the company 
will pay for transportation costs.
The second option is more profitable (under reasonable assumptions regarding 
the opportunity cost of time for commuting to malls), but it involves working out-
side the home, which is potentially stigmatized. Note that subjects are told that they 
will interview men in both cases.
Our randomization of interest was at the individual level, right before potential 
enumerators were offered the choice just described. One-half of the subjects (con-
trol group), were read the following passage:
Before I describe the position I would like to tell you that our company 
supports Vision 2030, which encourages women to participate in the Saudi 
labor force.
The other half of the subjects (information group), were read the following passage:
Before I describe the position I would like to tell you that our company 
supports Vision 2030, which encourages women to participate in the Saudi 
labor force. We would like to share some information about a recent study 
that may be of interest to you. In a recent survey of a national sample of 
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about 1,500 married Saudi men aged  18–35, 82 percent agreed with the 
statement ‘In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside of 
the home.’ This means that the vast majority of young married Saudi men 
support women working outside of the home.
The two groups get information that makes clear the stance of the company with 
respect to female labor force participation in Saudi Arabia. However, the second 
group gets additional information: they learn that the vast majority of young mar-
ried Saudi men support working outside the home. We therefore use the information 
generated by our own national survey, conducted previously.
This design let us keep the two positions as similar as possible, while varying 
exactly the one element we are interested in: whether or not the job is to be per-
formed outside the home. We examine two ( pre-registered) outcomes: subjects’ 
choice (on the phone call) between the two versions of the job and administrative 
data on job attendance.
B. Results
In online Appendix Table B11 we provide sample characteristics and tests of bal-
ance of covariates. Figure 9 displays our main findings. Panel A of Figure 9 shows 
that in the control condition, 18 percent of participants choose the  outside-the-home 
version of the job. In the group receiving information on the level of support for 
WWOH by Saudi males, the share increases by 15  percentage points, going to 
33 percent (the  p-value of a t-test of equality is 0.001). We also create a dummy 
variable using administrative data from the survey data, equal to one if the woman 
showed up to perform the  outside-the-home job, and zero otherwise. The findings 
are displayed in panel B of Figure 9. Job attendance behavior provides a consistent 
picture: 15 percent show up to perform the job outside the home in the absence of the 
information provision, and 27 percent do so in the group receiving information on 
social norms (  p-value = 0.009). Table 6 displays the findings in regression format.
Figure 9. Share of Women Choosing and Showing Up for  Outside-Home Job: Recruitment Experiment
Notes: Labor supply outcomes of female participants in the recruitment experiment; 95 percent binomial proportion 
confidence intervals.  p-values calculated from testing for equality of proportions. Panel A refers to the proportion 
of women who chose the offer to work outside the home. Panel B refers to the proportion of women who chose the 
offer and showed up for the  outside-the-home job (the outcome is a dummy equal to one if the woman accepted the 
offer to work outside the home and showed up for the job).
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Finally, it is important to note that the temporary nature of the job might inter-
act with its potential visibility. It is unclear whether the effects would be larger or 
smaller if the job was longer, in which case both visibility and monetary payoffs 
would be greater.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence that (i) the vast majority of married men in 
Saudi Arabia privately support women working outside of home; (ii) they substan-
tially underestimate the level of support by other men, including their own neigh-
bors; and (iii) correcting these beliefs about others affects their wives’ labor supply 
decisions. These results might help us understand the role that social norms play in 
constraining job opportunities for women in Saudi Arabia, but also how these con-
straints might be lifted by the simple provision of information. Active information 
provision might be particularly important in less democratic societies, where the 
availability of other natural aggregators of information (such as elections, referenda 
and even opinion polls) is more limited.
We end with potential avenues for future research. We view our findings as 
“proof of concept” of the potential for information provision to change behav-
ior regarding female labor supply in Saudi Arabia (and potentially in other coun-
tries). We believe that expanding the scale and observing how information spreads 
in networks, and how it affects a large set of outcomes is an important topic for 
future work. Also, the goal of the study was to understand the opinions and percep-
tions of male guardians in Saudi Arabia. As a result, we did not examine opinions 
and  perceptions of women, though our recruitment experiment targeted women. 
Evidence from the Arab Barometer suggests that the vast majority of women in the 
country are supportive of WWOH (92 percent). Future work can enrich the analysis 
Table 6—Share of Women Choosing and Showing Up 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (β ) 0.153 0.157 0.113 0.119
(0.0506) (0.0514) (0.0473) (0.0482)
Constant 0.181 0.147 0.153 0.180
(0.0322) (0.136) (0.0301) (0.126)
Inference robustness (β )
p-value: robust SE 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.014
p-value: permutation test 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.013
Controls ✓ ✓
Observations 291 291 291 291
R2 0.0305 0.0548 0.0191 0.0363
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 report estimates from OLS regressions respectively of an indicator for 
whether the respondent signed up (column 1) and showed up (column 3) for the job outside 
the home on the treatment indicator (information that most young married Saudi males support 
women working outside of home). Columns 2 and 4 include socioeconomic controls for age, 
marital status, number of children, education, and employment status. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Reported p-values for permutation tests derived from running 1,000 
replications in each case.
3028 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW OCTOBER 2020
on the women’s side of the labor supply decision process. Finally, understanding 
what is at the root of the stigma associated with women working outside of home 
might help design policies to address it: what are husbands trying to signal to others 
by acting in opposition to women working outside the home?
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